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Summary
In the wake of the pandemic of coronavirus disease 2019
(COVID-19), contact tracing has become a key element of
strategies to control the spread of severe acute respiratory
syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2). Given the rapid
and intense spread of SARS-CoV-2, digital contact tracing
has emerged as a potential complementary tool to support
containment and mitigation efforts. Early modelling studies
highlighted the potential of digital contact tracing to break
transmission chains, and Google and Apple subsequent-
ly developed the Exposure Notification (EN) framework,
making it available to the vast majority of smartphones.
A growing number of governments have launched or an-
nounced EN-based contact tracing apps, but their effec-
tiveness remains unknown. Here, we report early findings
of the digital contact tracing app deployment in Switzer-
land. We demonstrate proof-of-principle that digital con-
tact tracing reaches exposed contacts, who then test pos-
itive for SARS-CoV-2. This indicates that digital contact
tracing is an effective complementary tool for controlling
the spread of SARS-CoV-2. Continued technical improve-
ment and international compatibility can further increase
the efficacy, particularly also across country borders.
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Introduction
Contact tracing is a key element of the response to the pan-
demic of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), caused
by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2
(SARS-CoV-2). By 30 August 2020, nearly 25 million
diagnosed cases and over 800,000 confirmed deaths had
been recorded [1]. Contact tracing is part of a strategy of
“test, trace, isolate and quarantine” (TTIQ), which aims to
stop recently infected individuals from transmitting SARS-
CoV-2 [2]. The capacity for transmission before the onset
of symptoms and the short incubation period mean that
contact tracing has to be fast to be effective [3, 4]. Al-
though modelling results showed that rapid, digital contact
tracing could be a critical tool for containment and mitiga-
tion efforts [5], early efforts to develop and deploy digital
applications were hampered by critical limitations imposed
by smartphone operating systems and concerns about con-
fidentiality and data protection. The Exposure Notification
(EN) framework, jointly developed by Google and Apple,
addressed these limitations and enabled the implementa-
tion of digital contact tracing applications (apps) in which
all proximity contact information, and any decision-mak-
ing about whether or not to notify a user of an exposure, re-
main on a user’s device, rather than on the server of a cen-
tral authority. This approach minimises privacy risks [6],
but the restriction of information to users’ devices means
that data needed to evaluate the effectiveness of EN-based
contact tracing apps have to be collected from different
sources [7].
SwissCovid was the first EN-based contact tracing app
launched by a governmental public health authority, ini-
tially as a pilot to a limited number of users, on 25 May
2020. On 25 June 2020 the application was made available
to the general population. A growing number of govern-
ments have launched or announced EN-based contact trac-
ing apps, but their effectiveness remains unknown. The
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contact tracing systems was highlighted by the World
Health Organization [8] and is considered an ethical re-
quirement for the continued deployment of such systems
[9]. Here, we report early findings of the SwissCovid de-
ployment from 23 July 2020 to 10 September 2020 (here-
after referred to as the study period).
How does SwissCovid work?
The technical details of the SwissCovid system are given
in [10], but briefly, SwissCovid uses the EN framework
(version 1.2) to estimate proximity between phones. Each
phone generates a daily temporary exposure key (TEK),
from which fast rotating proximity identifiers are derived
and exchanged with neighbouring phones via Bluetooth
low energy (BLE) beacons. Upon confirmation of SARS-
CoV-2 infection by reverse transcriptase polymerase chain
reaction (RT-PCR) testing, authorised Swiss health profes-
sionals can generate a single-use validation code (Covid-
code), which is provided to the user. The Covidcode is
associated with the beginning of the contagious period,
which was determined to start 2 days before onset of symp-
toms [11] for symptomatic patients, and on the day of the
test for patients who are asymptomatic at the time of test-
ing. Upon entering a valid Covidcode in the app, TEKs
for the contagious period are transmitted from the user’s
phone to the computer server of the Swiss Federal Office
of Public Health (FOPH). All SwissCovid apps regularly
contact the server for uploaded TEKs and associated data,
and compute the exposure risk for the previous 10 days. To
ensure privacy, notifications are shown only on the phone
and are not forwarded to a server. During the study peri-
od, the notification provided users with the last day of ex-
posure, a reminder that they are entitled to a free RT-PCR
test, and directed them to a SwissCovid-specific hotline
(number only shown upon notification).
The BLE beacons, used by SwissCovid to estimate
whether two devices have been in close proximity to each
other for a period of time, are radio signals, which attenu-
ate with distance. The EN framework application program-
ming interface (API) estimates the amount of time a device
has been close enough to other devices of infected indi-
viduals, based on three different attenuation intervals. To
identify attenuation levels that would best estimate prox-
imity below 1.5 metres, attenuation levels for different
controlled and real-life scenarios produced by different de-
vices at different distances and orientation were measured,
and subsequently corrected using the per-device calibra-
tion values provided by the EN framework. Per-device cal-
ibration values take into account varying antenna and chip
characteristics that influence sending and receiving pow-
ers. These results informed the parameterisation of the EN
framework so that SwissCovid users are notified if they
spent at least 15 minutes in close proximity (1.5 metres) to
RT-PCR-confirmed cases.
Evaluation of privacy-preserving EN-based
digital contact tracing
Digital contract tracing is a new method, and it is therefore
crucial to rapidly evaluate and continuously monitor its ef-
fectiveness in the field. Digital contact tracing apps aim to
prevent secondary transmissions by warning exposed con-
tacts as early as possible [7]. To be an effective interven-
tion, several technical, behavioural and procedural condi-
tions must be met (fig. 1) [12]. The app must be used by
both the infected index case and exposed contacts (fig. 1,
row 1), the index case must enter the Covidcode follow-
ing a positive RT-PCR test (row 2), the exposed contacts
must receive notifications (row 3), and the exposed con-
tacts must respond to the warning in a timely fashion to
prevent further transmission (rows 4 and 5). These condi-
tions cannot be assessed directly via the app, owing to the
voluntary and decentralised nature of the system. Alterna-
tive indicators and data sources have therefore been devel-
oped or commissioned. In Switzerland, the Federal Statis-
tical Office (FSO) monitors downloads and active use of
SwissCovid and publicly releases the relevant number on a
daily basis [13, 14]. The FOPH updated the clinical regis-
tration form for RT-PCR-confirmed cases before the begin-
ning of the study period, and included the SwissCovid app
as an option for the reason for the test. In addition, several
ongoing research studies collect information about app us-
age and notifications received on a monthly basis, for ex-
ample Corona Immunitas [15], a nationwide Sars-CoV-2
seroprevalence study with digital follow-up surveys [16],
and the COVID-19 Social Monitor, a regular, longitudinal
online-survey on social, economic and behavioural aspects
related to COVID-19, drawn from a representative pan-
el for Switzerland. Furthermore, an ongoing cohort study
embedded in contact tracing in the canton of Zurich [17],
which enrols RT-PCR-confirmed cases and their close con-
tacts, investigates circumstances of transmissions and risk
exposures to SARS-CoV-2, and collects data about use of
the app.
Downloads and active use of the SwissCovid
app
To measure the number of app downloads and active apps,
reliable monitoring is already in place (fig. 1, box 1). By
10 September 2020, the SwissCovid app has been down-
loaded 2.36 million times, and the number of active apps
per day has been estimated at 1.62 million (fig. 2A). The
number of active users corresponds to 18.9% of the Swiss
population (8.6 million).
During the study period, the FOPH reported 12,456 con-
firmed SARS-CoV-2 cases. During the same time period,
the FOPH issued 2447 (19.6% of confirmed cases) Covid-
codes and 1645 (13.2% of confirmed cases, 67.2% of is-
sued Covidcodes) of these Covidcodes were entered into
the app by the users (fig. 1, box 2; fig. 2B). Although
the decentralised nature makes it impossible to know how
many notifications were subsequently generated, the en-
tered Covidcodes triggered 1695 phone calls to the Swiss-
Covid hotline, thus providing evidence for actions under-
taken by notified contacts (fig. 1, box 3; fig. 2B).
The Zurich SARS-CoV-2 Cohort is a longitudinal study
embedded in the contact tracing of the canton of Zurich
with continuous enrolment of RT-PCR-positive index cas-
es and exposed contacts. Recruitment started on 7 August,
and until 11 Sept, there were 235 index cases (median age
34 years, 51% males), and 185 exposed contacts (medi-
an age 33 years, 53% males) enrolled. Of the 235 index
cases, 148 (63%) used the app. Of those 148 app users,
134 (91%) received, and 127 (86%) uploaded the Covid-
code. Four cases did not upload the Covidcode because
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they had already informed their contacts when they re-
ceived the code. Three cases reported to have been tested
because of a SwissCovid alert. Of the 185 exposed con-
tacts, 132 (71%) used the app. Of those 132 app users, 46
(35%) received the SwissCovid warning related to the ex-
posure that brought them into contact with the cantonal au-
thorities.
Evidence for app users responding to notifica-
tions
Routine public health surveillance data suggest that noti-
fied contacts seek SARS-CoV-2 testing (fig. 1, box 4). In-
formation on the reason for RT-PCR testing has been col-
lected during the study period and was available for 7842
Figure 1: Quality of evidence for SwissCovid app effectiveness. Row labels: necessary technical, procedural and behavioural conditions
for digital contact tracing to be effective. Columns: milestones in evidence accumulation. Green boxes indicate available data sources for evi-
dence assessments; quantitative information related to green boxes are provided in the main text.
Figure 2: SwissCovid app measures. (A) Total number of downloaded apps and daily number of active apps. (B) Daily numbers of con-
firmed SARS-CoV-2 cases, generated Covidcodes, entered Covidcodes and hotline calls. (C) Age distribution of cases stratified by the reason
for RT-PCR test (either SwissCovid app or other reason). (D) Expected number of RT-PCR-confirmed cases that were tested because of a no-
tification by the app as a function of hypothetical app coverage during the study period. Error bars and the blue shaded area correspond to
95% confidence intervals.
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(63%) of the 12,456 confirmed cases. Among these, 6380
reported symptoms compatible with COVID-19, 487 re-
ported outbreak investigation, and 41 reported the Swiss-
Covid app as the reason for the test (fig. 1, box 5). As the
information on the reason for the test was only complete
for 63% of confirmed cases, the total number of cases that
were tested because of the notification by the app is like-
ly to be higher. To estimate this number, we applied mul-
tiple imputation by chained equation [18], accounting for
the effect of age and sex on the probability of missing in-
formation. This approach yielded a total of 65 cases (95%
confidence interval [CI] 54–77) reporting the SwissCovid
app as the reason for testing over the period considered.
These cases displayed a slightly younger age distribution
but a similar sex distribution compared with cases report-
ing another reason for testing (fig. 2C).
Effectiveness of the SwissCovid app
A key measure to quantify the effectiveness of contact trac-
ing at identifying SARS-CoV-2 infections is the number of
positive contacts per index case. This number depends on
several factors, such as the number of contacts traced per
index case and the overall dynamics of the epidemic. Two
large studies of classic contact tracing for SARS-CoV-2
found 23 secondary cases in contacts of 100 index cases
(0.23, 95% CI 0.15–0.32) in Taiwan [19] and 2169 posi-
tive cases in contacts of 5706 index cases (0.38, 95% CI
0.37–0.39) in South Korea [20]. To compare the effective-
ness of the SwissCovid app to these classic contact tracing
studies, we estimated the number of notified positive con-
tacts using the app per index case who entered a Covidcode
using the formula ε = n/(cμ), where n = 65 (95% CI 54–77)
is the imputed total number of confirmed cases that report-
ed the SwissCovid app as the reason for the test, c = 1645
is the number of entered Covidcodes, and μ = 16.7% is the
proportion of the Swiss population who are active users of
the app, weighted by the number of confirmed cases per
day. Hence, the term cμ corresponds to the number of in-
dex cases entering Covidcodes scaled by the probability
that their contacts use the SwissCovid app assuming a ho-
mogeneous distribution of the app coverage. We obtained
ε = 0.24 (95% CI 0.20–0.27), which is in a similar range to
the numbers from the classic contact tracing studies.
Several factors could affect the estimated effectiveness of
the SwissCovid app. Due to clustering of app users, the
calculated ε could represent an upper estimate as the up-
take of the SwissCovid app in contacts of app users might
be higher than the average uptake in the Swiss population.
Assuming μ = 71%, which is the uptake of the app in con-
tacts of RT-PCR-confirmed cases from the Zurich SARS-
CoV-2 Cohort, we obtained ε = 0.06 (95% CI 0.05–0.06)
as a lower estimate that would still represent a respectable
effectiveness of the app at identifying SARS-CoV-2 infec-
tions in contacts of index cases. However, a number of fac-
tors can also contribute to an underestimate of ε. First, con-
firmed cases might only report the presence of symptoms
as the reason for the test even though they were notified by
the app. Second, as a result of the decentralised and volun-
tary nature of SwissCovid, there may have been more no-
tified contacts that became infected and self-isolated fol-
lowing the notification, but did not get tested, and are thus
missing from the analysis. Third, reported numbers of RT-
PCR-confirmed cases using the app for the study period
might be slightly higher in reality because of time delays
in reporting.
Reliable, continuous monitoring of app effectiveness in-
dicators is still being improved. Also, citizen reports on
social media (e.g., Twitter) have suggested multi-day de-
lays in receiving Covidcodes following positive test results
in some instances. Along the same lines, during the study
period, only about two thirds of issued Covidcodes have
been entered and triggered notifications (fig. 2B). Efforts
to streamline procedures and app user interactions with lo-
cal health authorities – i.e., a direct referral of notified hot-
line callers to the responsible local authorities – are un-
derway. Our findings illustrate that digital contact tracing
can be effective even with low uptake, as suggested by
mathematical modelling [21]. Because app coverage af-
fects both the number of index cases and their contacts, the
total number of SARS-CoV-2 infections that could be iden-
tified through digital contact tracing scales with the square
of the coverage and could substantially increase with high-
er uptake (fig. 2D).
In conclusion, based on the data collected during the initial
deployment of the SwissCovid app, we argue that volun-
tary digital contact tracing can show similar effectiveness
at identifying infected partners of index cases as classic
contact tracing, provided that both the index case and the
exposed contacts use the app. As the effectiveness of dig-
ital contact tracing crucially depends on a strong embed-
ding into an efficient testing and contact tracing infrastruc-
ture on the ground, apps such as SwissCovid represent a
helpful complementary tool for controlling the spread of
SARS-CoV-2. The strength of evidence for app effective-
ness as summarised in figure 1 illustrates that most indica-
tors have reached at least a “proof-of-principle” stage. That
is, the outcome of interest was observed independently in
two data sources in all important key indicators. There is,
however, still room for improvement. Improvements in the
EN API by Apple and Google include an increase of the
precision in determining risk, and a reduction in the delay
in communicating it to users. International interoperabili-
ty exchanges will increase the effectiveness of the app, in
particular in the countries bordering Switzerland. Speed is
essential to the effectiveness of TTIQ strategies [4, 5]. Re-
ducing the time to quarantine for contacts, as a result of
digital contact tracing, should provide an additional, im-
portant benefit to COVID-19 mitigation efforts.
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